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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)G).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
L Did the trial court abuse Its discretion by granting defendants' motion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute when the defendants had asserted a counterclaim and
when? !:u!a >a:"t;e>had iaik-: .<, ;;ro>v;-i]n; ;U:;/ si:i-i/\:> />>r at;:-j;r-: -.inM'tv; -. MU: -.a/
period?
Standard of Appellate Review
In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute, the appellate court will review the decision under an ahi ise of
discretion standard. Hartford Lease Corp. v. State, 838 P.2d 694 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994).
Issues Preserved in Trial Court
This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 1761-1780.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b):
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court,
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the
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plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of
his evidence the defendant without warving his right to offer evidence in the event the
motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then
determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits
against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication
upon the merits.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This matter comes before this Court pursuant to Janet Peterson's (hereinafter
referred to as "Peterson") appeal of the Order signed by the Honorable Claudia Laycock,
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge, on January 6.2004. and entered on January 7,2004.
This case arises out of a claim by Peterson against Sunrider Corporation, d.b.a.
Sunrider International (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sunrider"), for breach of
contract and the covenants of good faith and fair dealing, and against Tei Fu Chen

(hereinafter referred to as "Chen"), the Chairman of Sunrider s Board of Directors, for
tortious interference with contract.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Peterson filed a Complaint -n :hj !\ ur;h ':i-ivxi Conn of Utah, in and for Utah
County on March 19, 1996. (R. 1-9). Sunrider and Chen tiled their Answer on May 3,
1996. (R. 13-19). Peterson subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on September 11,
1996. (R. 42-53). Sunrider and Chen filed an Answer To Amended Complaint And
Counterclaim on October 8, 1996. t / .

-o3>, ami Peterson filed an Answer To

Counterclaim on October 9, 1996. (R. 64-66).
After successfully appealing to the Utah Supreme Court the dismissal of Peterson's
claim, this matter was remanded to the Fourth District Court on May 16. 2002. for further
proceedings. (R. 1730-1750). On August 29. 2003, Sunrider and Chen fled a Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute with accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. (R. 1755-1760). On September 16. 2003, Peterson
filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute (R. 1761-1780). Sunrider and Chen tiled a Reply to Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute on September
29.2003. (R. 1781-1784).

On November 26, 2003, a Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute was tiled. (R. 1788-1795). The Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was entered
on January 7. 2004. (R. 1801-1802).
Statement of Facts
1. After filing an initial Complaint. Peterson filed an Amended Complaint on
September 11,1996, to which Sunrider and Chen filed an Answer To Amended Complaint
And Counterclaim on October 8, 1996. (R. 42-63).
2. Sunrider"s and Chen's Counterclaim stated that Ma case and controversy exists
between the parties regarding their respective rights and duties" and sought a judicial
determination of the force, scope and effect any agreements which may govern the
relationship between the parties. (R. 55-56).
3. On May 18, 1998, the Honorable Howard H. Maetani held consolidated oral
arguments on Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment and Sunrider's and Chen's
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, as well as other non-dispositive motions
filed by both Peterson and Sunrider and Chen. (R. 14^2).
4. On June 15,1998, Judge Maetani issued a Memorandum Decision granting
Sunrider's and Chen's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and denying
Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment (R. 1575-85).
5. On October 6, 1998, Judge Maetani signed and entered an Order memorializing
his ruling in the June 15, 1998 Memorandum Decision. (R. 1613-16).
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o. On October 14. 1998, Peterson tiled a Notice Of Appeal with the trial court. (R.
1620-21).
7. On December 15, 1998. Chief Justice Howe signed an Order dismissing
Peterson's appeal because the Order appealed from was ruled to be a nonfmai judgment.
(R. 1640).
8. On January 21,2000, the Supreme Court issued a Remittor to the trial court. (R.
1641).
9. On March 31, 2000, the Honorable James R. Taylor entered an Order adopting
the findings and conclusions of fact and law in Judge Maetanfs June 15, 1998
Memorandum Decision, granting Sunrider's and Chen's motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment and denying Peterson's motion for partial summary judgment. (R.
1668-69).
10. On April 19, 2000, Peterson filed a Notice Of Appeal with the trial court. (R.
1690-91).
11. On April 26, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court entered its decision, which
reversed the order dismissing Peterson's claims, affirmed the denial of Peterson's Motion
for Summary Judgment, and remanded the matter to the trial court. (R. 1739-1748).
12. On July 8, 2003. a scheduling conference was held before Judge Laycock;
present were counsel for Peterson, Sunrider and Chen. (R. 1754).

13. According to the Minutes of Scheduling Conference for July 8, 2003, "the
amended complaint is to be filed by 8-12-2002. Counsel will then file a scheduling order
and a pre-trial may be set at that time." (R. 1754).
14. On August 29, 2003, Sunrider and Chen filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Prosecute with accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute. (R. 1755-1760).
15. On November 26,2003, a Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Prosecute was filed, which granted the motion, and the Order of Dismissal With
Prejudice was entered on January 7, 2004.

(R. 1788-1795 and 1801-1802).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in entering the January 7, 2004 Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice. The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice Peterson "s
case where Sunrider and Chen had asserted a counterclaim and neither the Plaintiff nor the
Defendants had failed to prosecute their claims within a one year period.

6

ARGUMENT
L Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting defendants1
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute when the defendants had
asserted a counterclaim and where both parties had failed to prosecute
their claims for approximately a one year period?
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b), a defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him for the plaintiffs failure to prosecute.
In reviewing whether a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, the trial court has
discretion whether to grant such amotion. Wilson v. Lambert 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980).
The trial court must consider the following factors when determining whether to grant a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute: (1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward: (3) what each of the parties has
done to move the case forward: (4) what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to
the other side by the party's delay: and (5), most important, whether injustice may result
from the dismissal. Maxrield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied,
789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) citing K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean. 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982) and
Utah Oil Co. v Harris. 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977).
A review of the record indicates that both Sunrider and Chen have not undertaken
any action to move this case to a resolution during die approximately one year Peterson
failed to act—no correspondence with Pedersen's counsel inquiring about the status of the
Amended Complaint, no further discover}7, no inquiry about a pre-trial conference, and no
foilow-up on a Motion to Compel which was granted, which required Pedersen to provide

additional answers to Sunrider's and Chen's Interrogatories. Furthermore, both Sunrider
and Chen did nothing to prosecute their counterclaim, the declarator}'judgment regarding
any contractual relationships between the parties. The Utah Supreme Court has held that
it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute
where either party could have obtained relief to bring the case to a conclusion, but neither
did so for almost four years. Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977). The
Johnson court reasoned that "since any party to this action could have obtained the relief
to which was entitled...but both parties chose to dally for a number of years, it was an
abuse of discretion to grant respondent's motion to dismiss." Johnson, 571 P.2d at 1369
quoting Crystal Lime & Cement Co.v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 393. 335 P.2d 624, 626
(1959). In Crystal Lime, the case lay idle for approximately eight years when the
defendant sought a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute; however, the Crystal Lime
court reasoned that because the defendant had filed a counterclaim, it had become "crosscomplainants in the action" and could not seek to dismiss the opposing party's claim when
he himself had dallied "for a number of years." Crystal Lime, 8 Utah 2d at 393, 335 P.2d
at 626. Like the defendant in Crystal Lime, both Sunrider and Chen have filed a
Counterclaim, seeking declaratory relief from this Court and have become "crosscomplainants" in this matter. And also like the defendant in Crvstal Lime, Sunrider and
Chen cannot seek to dismiss Peterson's claim because of a failure to prosecute when they
themselves have not prosecuted their own claims within the same period of time.
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Another factor which the trial court must weigh is what difficulty or prejudice may
have been caused to the other side by the delay. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul
W. Larsen Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). Both Sunrider and Chen have not
suffered any prejudice as a result of a nearly one year delay in this matter. In fact, nowhere
in the Defendants' Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss does either Sunrider
or Chen allege that they have been prejudiced by the one year delay. (R. 1755-1760).
The most important Maxfield factor is whether injustice may result from the
dismissal of the action. Maxfield, 779 P.2d at 239. This matter has been ongoing for
several years—through two appeals and countless motions and discovery—and will soon
be ready for trial since most of the discovery has already occurred. It would serve as a
great injustice to Peterson, who has undertaken extensive prosecution of this matter from
depositions to an appeal before the Utah Supreme Court, if her claims are summarily
dismissed because both her and the opposing parties failed to act during the past year.
It is further important to note that in other cases whether one party sought dismissal
of the case for failure to prosecute, the actual time period which the matter had sat idle was
a greater time than merely the one year in the present action. The Utah Supreme Court has
found that it was not an abuse of discretion to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute where five and a half years had elapsed before prosecuting the claim. Brasher
Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown. 23 Utah 2d 247. 461 P.2d 464 (1969). See also Grundman
v. Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984) (a period of four years of case
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idleness), Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977) (where neither party
brought the case to a conclusion for nearly four years), Countrv Meadows Convalescent
Ctr.v. Utah Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) (inactivity for over five
years), and Crystal Lime & Cement Co.v. Robbins. 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959)
(inactivity by both parties over an eight year period). The period where this matter has sat
idle is only approximately one year and has not been a sufficient time whereby the trial
court could have found that Peterson has failed to prosecute her claims.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons and analysis, Peterson respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's January 7. 2004 Order of Dismissal with Prejudice.

<Aday of July, 2004.

DATED this W

ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER. LC

Thomii W. Seiler
Ryan T. Peel
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

1. November 26, 2003 Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute
2. January 7, 2004 Order of Dismissal With Prejudice

Tabl

FILED
Fourth Judicial D.strtct Court
of Utah Countv, State of U t a l

CARMA B. SMITH, C\er\

•(£
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COlLJNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JANET PETERSON,

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE

Plaintiff,
v.
SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRIDER
INTERNATIONAL, and TEI FU CHEN,

Date: November 26, 2003
Case No. 960400174
Judge Claudia Laycock
Division 5

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, filed
by the defendants, Sunrider Corp., dba Sunrider International, and Tei Fu Chen ("defendants"),
which was fully briefed and submitted to the Court on October 1, 2003. Defendants requested a
hearing; however, pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(C)(b), the Court deems a hearing unnecessary, as
the "dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided." Therefore, having read the memoranda and being duly informed, the
Court now enters the following ruling.
RELEVANT FACTS
1. The original complaint in this matter was filed on March 19, 1996.
2. After a pretrial conference on March 11, 1999, no action was taken by plaintiff for a
period often months.
3. Defendants brought a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute on February 2, 2000.
4. Defendant's motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court on February 22, 2000,
1

without a response from plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an untimely response on February 24, 2000.
5. After defendants filed the motion to dismiss, plaintiff began the series of actions to
secure a final order and start the appellate process.
6. On March 30, 2000, Judge James R. Taylor signed an order which clarified previous
orders and provided a "final order," so that plaintiff could begin her appeal.
7. On April 30, 2000 plaintiff filed her notice of appeal.
8. On April 26, 2002 the Supreme Court of Utah issued an opinion which reversed the
summary judgment order dismissing plaintiffs claim, affirmed the denial of plaintiff s own
motion for partial summary judgment, and remanded the case back to the district court level.
9. On May 14, 2002 this case was remitted back to the district court for proceedings
consistent with the previously issued opinion.
10. On June 10, 2002 counsel for defendants filed a document entitled Request for
Scheduling Conference, asking to establish dates for the completion of discovery and other pretrial activities.
11. During a scheduling conference held on July 8, 2002, this Court ruled that Janet
Peterson ("plaintiff) could file an amended complaint and established August 12, 2002 as a
deadline for such filing. The Court also ordered the parties' attorneys to then file a scheduling
order, after which a pretrial conference could be set.
12. The amended complaint has never been filed, nor have the parties' attorneys ever
filed a scheduling order or requested a pretrial conference. In fact, no further documents were
filed by either party until August 29, 2003.
2

13. On August 29, 2003, counsel for defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Prosecute, asking the Court to dismiss this action according to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, because plaintiffs have done nothing to advance this case since the July 8, 2002
hearing.
14. On September 16, 2003 plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion.
15. On September 29, 2003 defendants filed a reply memorandum.
16. On October 1, 2003 plaintiff filed a notice to submit.
DISCUSSION
Rule 41(b) states in relevant part, "For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against him . . . Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal
under this subdivision...operates as an adjudication upon the merits." Both parties acknowledge
that a significant portion of the decision on a motion to dismiss is based upon the Court's
discretion. See Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980).
In addition to the "mere elapse of time," the court may consider the following factors
when interpreting Rule 41(b) and motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute: "(1) 'The conduct
of both parties'; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move the case forward; (3) what
each party has accomplished in moving the case forward; (4) the difficulty or prejudice imposed
on the opposing party by reason of the delay; and (5) "'most important, whether injustice may
result from the dismissal/" Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694, 697-698 (Ut.
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App. 1994). These are factors that the court may consider, but they are neither mandatory nor
exhaustive.
The case presently before the Court was filed in 1996 and has had a long and complicated
history, including a ruling on summary judgment that was appealed to and reversed by the Utah
Supreme Court. Although the case was remitted to the district court level on May 14, 2002, the
record demonstrates that plaintiff has made no attempt to move this case along since that date.
Defendants have filed the only two motions found in the file since May 2002: (1) a motion for a
scheduling conference and (2) this motion for dismissal for failure to prosecute. Both parties
appeared at the July 8, 2003 hearing before the Court, at which time the Court granted plaintiffs
request to file her amended complaint adding a new party. Plaintiff subsequently failed to
comply with the Court's deadline, and, to this date, has still not submitted an amended
complaint.
Plaintiff argues that defendants should not prevail on this motion because the "defendants
have done nothing in the past year to move this case forward." Specifically, plaintiff faults
defendants for (1) their failure to inquire through correspondence as to the status of the amended
complaint, (2) their failure to undertake any further discovery, (3) their failure to inquire about
the required attorneys' planning meeting, and (4) their failure to follow up on their earlier
successful motion to compel (requiring plaintiff to provide additional answers to
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interrogatories).1 Surprisingly, plaintiff offers no excuse or justification for her failure to file her
amended complaint or for her failure to set up the Rule 26 meeting and to request a pretrial
conference.
Based upon the particular circumstances of this case, the Court finds that it was not
defendants' responsibility to move this case forward. Placing that burden upon defendants would
have put them in the absurd position of begging plaintiff to file her amended complaint so that
defendants could respond to it and proceed with discovery. Clearly, defendants had no motive to
incur the additional cost of further discovery or trial, when plaintiff was supposed to file an
amended complaint, but did not. As stated in Hartford:
We pause to note the obvious: What each party has done to move the case
forward can only be evaluated in light of each party's responsibility concerning
the case. Of course, the plaintiff, as the party initiating the lawsuit, has the
primary responsibility to move the case forward. The defendant's responsibility is
limited to responding timely to the action, expeditiously attending to discovery,
and moving any counterclaim along. The defendant has no general responsibility
to move plaintiffs action to judgment.
Id. at 698.
This Court finds that defendants have fulfilled their responsibility in this matter, as they
have had no "general responsibility" since July 8, 2003 to "move plaintiffs action to judgment."
Id. In the history of this case, plaintiff has twice allowed this case to stagnate; however, this

Plaintiffs counsel has submitted no support for this position through affidavit or any
other evidentiary source. The Court can determine from the file that no discovery documents
have been filed by either party subsequent to the July 8, 2003 hearing (other than the present
motion, etc.), but the Court has absolutely no admissible evidence before it that there has been no
correspondence between the parties or inquiry about the attorneys' planning meeting.
5

second occasion is of greater concern, as it was clearly plaintiffs responsibility to move this
forward after her successful appeal. More than a year elapsed before defendants filed their
motion to dismiss; plaintiff accomplished absolutely nothing during that year-plus time period.
The Court is not persuaded by plaintiffs arguments that, since this case was filed in 1996,
a one-year delay does not prejudice the defendants. The opposite argument is much more
persuasive; where the case was already 6 years old when the appellate decision was rendered,
time was clearly of the essence, and plaintiff should have kept this matter moving.
Plaintiff also argues that the matter "will soon be ready for trial," dismissing the case
"would serve as a great injustice" to the plaintiff, and one year of inactivity does not justify
dismissal. The case law indicates that the simple matter of time is highly fact-sensitive and is not
determinative. In this case, which is now almost 8 years old, the Court has nothing before it
which would persuade it that the case will soon be ready for trial, especially when the last
hearing before this Court resulted in permission for plaintiff to file an amended complaint, which
would add a party. The Court is also persuaded that the plaintiffs inattention to this case during
2 distinct time periods demonstrates that plaintiff fears no great prejudice due to dismissal of this
matter; otherwise, she would have kept this matter moving forward.
Any injustice that results from this dismissal is outweighed by plaintiffs own lack of
interest in the case and the injustice to defendant of carrying the burden of a law suit forward on
behalf of plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute is granted. Counsel for
6

defendant is to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order consistent with this
ruling.

<fi^

DATED this 9ip day of November, 2003.
,

Case No. 960400174
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H. Thomas Stevenson, #6803
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
PROVO DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
JANET PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

:

SUNRIDER CORP., dba SUNRIDER
INTERNATIONAL, and TEI FU
CHEN,
Defendants.

:

Case No. 960400174
Judge: Claudia Laycock

:
:

The above-entitled matter came on regularly on Defendant's motion to dismiss
for failure to prosecute. The court having entered its ruling, and findings of fact and
conclusions of law in favor of Defendant, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND
DECREES that the above-entitled case be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice
based upon Plaintiffs failure to prosecute.

Thomas H. Seiler
Attorney for Plaintiff

RUL£ 4-504 NOTICE
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the undersigned
will submit the foregoing Order to Judge Claudia Laycock of the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County, for signature upon the expiration of eight days from
j Q £ ^ a £ 2 ^ ? 2 0 0 3 , unless written objection is filed prior to that time.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

'3rad C. Smith
Attorney for Defendants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order by U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, this fU
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2003, to the following:

Thomas H. Seiler
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER
80 North 1000 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
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